The perennial tug-of-war between government interests and individual liberties is playing out in the battle over encrypted messaging. Technology tilts the field toward individuals.
Articles on Encryption backdoor
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Facebook is planning to put end-to-end encryption on all its messaging services soon. But governments aren’t happy about it, as it could make it harder to catch criminals.
The first internet communication was underwhelming, thanks to a computer crash. But a lot has happened since then – including key decisions that helped build the internet of today.
The broad and ill-defined new powers outlined in the government’s new telecommunications bill are neither necessary nor proportionate – and contain significant scope for abuse.
It is hard to know whether metadata retention has been effective or necessary. We can only hope that the debate over accessing and analysing encrypted services is a little more enlightening.
Scholars dig in to the debate on whether police should be able to defeat or circumvent encryption systems.
The FBI and police officials say they need to decrypt secure communications to fight crime. But they have other options, and modern threats make clear the importance of strong encryption.
Governments’ efforts to weaken communications security undermine and distract from the need to protect the real weak points in our online communications.
Apple’s design decisions don’t please everyone, but in the iPhone the company created something truly revolutionary that has lasted.
Cracking down on extremism online won’t solve the problem of extremist violence, will inevitably censor speech that’s important to protect and risks harming political dissidents and democracy itself.
The technical consensus is clear: Adding ‘backdoors’ to encryption algorithms weakens everyone’s security. So what are the police and intelligence agencies to do?
Top contributors
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Professor of Law, University of Connecticut
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Professor, Information Security Group, Royal Holloway, University of London
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Emeritus Professor in Law and Criminal Justice, Adelaide University
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Professor of Cyber Security and Policy, Tufts University
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Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University
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Professor of Information Security, Royal Holloway, University of London
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Professor of Computer Science, Elon University
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Senior lecturer, Deakin University
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Postdoctoral Fellow, Cyber Security Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
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Professor of Criminology, University of Leeds
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Lawyer, Curtin University
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Teaching Professor of Computer Science and Electrical Engineering, and Associate Director, UMBC Cybersecurity Institute, University of Maryland, Baltimore County